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ABSTRACT
REWARD ALLOCATION FOR MAXIMIING ENERGY SAVINGS
IN A TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
MAY 2018
ADEWALE O ODUWOLE,
B.S., GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, DC
M.P.S., GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, DC
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Directed by: Professor. Song Gao Ph.D
Transportation has a major impact on our society and environment,
contributing 70% of U.S petroleum use, 28% of U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, over 34,000 fatalities and 2.2 million injuries in 2013. Punitive
approaches to used to tackle environmental issues in the transportation sector, such
as congestion pricing have been well documented, although the use of incentives or
rewards lags behind in comparison. In addition to the use of more fuel-efficient,
alternate energy vehicles and various other energy reduction strategies; energy
consumption can be lowered through incentivizing alternative modes of
transportation. This paper focused on modifying travelers’ behavior by providing
rewards to enable shifts to more energy-efficient modes, (e.g., from auto to either
bus or bicycles). Optimization conditions are formulated for the problem to
understand solution properties, and numerical tests are carried out to study the
effects of system parameters (e.g., token budget and coefficient of tokens) on the
optimal solutions (i.e., energy savings). The multinomial logit model is used to
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formulate the full problem, comprised of an objective function and constraint of a
token budget ranging from $5,000-$10,000. Comparably, the full problem is
computationally reduced by various parameterization strategies, in that the number
of tokens assigned to all travelers’ is parameterized and proportional to the
expected energy savings. An optimization solution algorithm is applied with a global
and local solver to solve a lagrangian sub-problem and a duo of heuristic solution
algorithms of the original problem. These were determined necessary to attain an
optimal and feasible solution. Input data necessary for this analysis is obtained for
the Town of Amherst, MA from the Pioneer Valley Planning Commission (PVPC). The
results demonstrated strong evidence to conclude a positive correlation between
the system’s energy savings and the aforementioned system parameters. The local
and global solvers solution algorithm reduced the average energy consumption by
11.48% - 19.91% and12.79% – 21.09% consecutively for the identified token
budget range from a base case scenario with no tokens assigned. The duo of
lagrangian heuristic algorithms improved the full problems solution i.e., higher
energy savings, when optimized over a local solver, while the parameterized
problem formulations resulted in higher energy savings when compared to the full
problems’ formulation solution over local solver, but higher energy savings
compared over the global solver. The Computational run-time for the global and
local solvers solution algorithm for the full problem formulation required 43 hours
and 24 minutes consecutively, while the local solver for the lagrangian heuristics
and parameterized problem solution algorithm took 13 minutes and 7 minutes
consecutively.
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Future research on this paper will be comprised of a bi-level optimization
problem formulation where a high level optimization aims at maximizing systemwide energy savings, while a low-level consumer surplus maximization problem is
solved for each system user.
Key Words: Energy Savings, Fuel Consumption, Energy Optimization,
Incentive-Based Pricing, and System Optimization.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
The motivation behind providing incentives for maximizing energy savings
in a transportation system stems from the far-reaching impact of energy
consumption on our society and environment. Transportation activities accounted
for 33 percent of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion in 2011, while it was
estimated that approximately 25% of household vehicle mile traveled (VMT) were
commute trips and 79% of commuters drove alone to work (1). Virtually all of the
energy consumed in this end-use sector came from petroleum products and nearly
65% of the emissions resulted from gasoline consumption for personal vehicle use.
In the long term, energy consumption patterns respond to changes that affect the
scale of consumption (e.g., population, number of cars), the efficiency with which
energy is used in equipment (e.g., cars, power plants, steel mills) and behavioral
choices (e.g., walking, bicycling, or telecommuting to work instead of driving). While
technology has generally been used to increase fuel economy by improving
efficiency (which has reduced CO2 emissions) along the years(2). Historically, there
has been a negative perception and public resistance conveyed by road users on the
implementation of punitive approaches such as congestion pricing to reduce energy
consumption. Inequality on the end-users side is one of many other major concerns
highlighted in recent literature. Hence, reward-based approach is considered a more
user-friendly policy in reducing road congestion and emissions.
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It is widely recognized that governments could reduce congestion and its
associated environmental effects by charging road users their marginal cost of
excess demand during peak hours in transportation systems. This policy is
commonly known as congestion pricing. Congestion pricing has been well
researched, documented and implemented in a few major cities in the past decade,
although it has faced major criticism and public resentment from an equitability
point of view from connected neighborhoods where it is implemented. In the most
recent field of sustainability, which is seen to be gaining more popularity in both the
academic and professional career disciplines, equity is considered one of three
major characteristics that define the quintessence of achieving a sustainable-based
transportation policy. In sustainable transportation engineering and planning
discipline, governments are starting to consider the efficient use of incentive
policies as a primary substitute to congestion pricing, with the outlook that it has
the potential to alleviate the most significant critic of congestion pricing, equity.
Recent literatures have highlighted governments intervention through
incentive policies such as offering financial incentive in form of subsidies, gift cards,
transit passes or monetary payment reimbursements to road users, to aide
intelligent decisions on travel time and mode choice of transportation as potential
substitute to congestion pricing policies externalities. As of March 2016, the United
States government through the Department of the Navy (DON) and Department of
Transportation (DOT) established a mass transit benefit program, the transit
incentive program (TIP) for DON, part-time federal and intern employees to help
reduce their daily contribution to traffic congestion and air pollution to and from
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work, in conjunction with expanding their commuting alternatives(3). Applicable to
civilian and military employees in the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia
(DMV), all geographic counties within their associated boundaries and all DON
facilities within the US territories, the TIP provides transit benefits of $255/month
(individual benefit) excluding parking fees for transit modes by commuter bus,
commuter

trains,

subway/light

rail,

vanpool

and

ferries.

Similarly,

the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Interior (DOI)
adopted a similar program, the Transportation Subsidy Program (TSP) that
provides financial incentives to encourage DOI employees nationwide to commute
by means other than single-occupancy motor vehicles to and from work (4).
Several studies have reported the effects of incentive policies on commuter
mode choices, significant to this research, Qing Su et al. 2012 developed a nested
logit model to examine the impact of parking management and financial subsidies to
alternative modes to drive alone, as well as travel demand management strategies
on people's commute mode choices in Seattle based on the Washington state
commute trip reduction dataset in 2005. A two-level nested logit model was
selected to estimate the mode choices of (motor, non-motor and public) at the first
level and (drive alone, share ride, transit and bike/walk) at the second level. A
multinomial logit model was rejected after a hausman specification test of the
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property violation at a level of 0.01(5).
Focusing on financial subsidies as a public policy tool, findings from Qing Su and et
al, 2012 suggests that commuters respond positively to direct financial subsidies to
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alternative modes and represent an important contribution toward understanding
how commuter's mode choice decisions respond to a variety of incentive policies.
In general, there is sufficient data, research and literature that suggests
transit use may be affected by incentive polices that modify the relative costs of
travel behavior. According to the US. Department of transportation, such incentives
have been seen to increase public transportation use and use of active travel options
such as walking and bicycling particularly among college students(6). Nevertheless,
there is a gap in literatures on modeling framework for incentive policy
optimizations to reduce energy consumption in a transportation system. This forms
the basis of this study on the need for an efficacious modeling framework that
effectively allocates these resources/incentives to end-users.

1.2 Literature Review
It is of importance to understand factors that affect consumer’s
transportation mode choice, which calls for the adoption of a behavioral choice
model while designing incentive optimization problems. A large body of literature
exists on such models using discrete choice model approaches. For a review, (Jiang
et al. 2009) conducted a study analyzing non-motorized transportation mode choice
considering the influence of trip purpose, distance and car availability with a stated
and revealed preference data survey in china(7).
In a researcher paper by Michael A. Silas et al. a mathematical formulation
was established to gain insights into the most efficient way to allocate financial
incentives to customers in an urban environment in other to maximize participation

4

and optimally distribute the incentives(8). The methodology involved the utilization
of the Karush-Kuhn Tucker (KKT) condition to find the optimal amount of truck
tours/trips shifted to non-peak hours. Two main important decisions were
identified in this study for the optimal allocation of an incentive budget; the total
budget to be distributed, and the allocation of the budget among different market
segmentations. Focusing on the latter, mathematical formulations were developed,
which involved the derivation of the optimal incentives distinguished by two types
of constraints, namely, an exogenous and endogenous budget. The latter being a
self-sustaining budget is formulated as a function of the total revenue generated by
the system and the former an external budget distributed to recipients of the
incentive, formulated to require the total amount of incentives distributed to the
recipients be less that or equal to the budget constraint. While considering the
exogenous budgets, numerical results showed that there was an increasing nonlinear relationship between the number of tours transferred to the off-hours and the
given incentive budget. This relationship was characterized by a rapid increase at
the beginning followed by smaller increases in the number of tours transferred to
off-hours. Numerical results of the endogenous budget showed that the number of
off-hour tours increased as the regular-hour tour revenues increased. With a similar
characteristic as the former, the off-hours tour increased rapidly at the beginning
followed by an incremental reduction in the increments (8).
In a study of Intermodal Transportation Network Design with Emission
Incentive and Mode Transfer cost by Peiyu Luo et al., the researchers considered the
problem of designing an intermodal transportation network consisting of three
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modes; highway, rail and inland waterway with a partial objective to incentivize
shippers using a more energy efficient modes such as waterways and railways to
promote intermodal transportation while satisfying a fixed annual demand from
multiple origin-destination pairs(9). The problem was framed as a linear
programming formulation to minimize the total transportation cost and time value,
while including incentive rebates motivated by the objective of promoting the use of
inland waterways and railways by the USDOT on a hypothesized super network. No
incentives were awarded to roadways. Conclusions from numerical results outlined
revealed incentives rebates for railways and waterways encouraged shippers to use
railways and waterways which contribute to significant reductions emissions and
total transportation cost while transportation time increased.
A study on the optimization of incentive policies for plug-in electric vehicles
Nie Yu et al., proposed an optimization modeling framework that could potentially
assist policy makers in deciding when and how much money should be invested on
what incentive programs in order to achieve a desired goal, e.g reduce greenhouse
gas or dependence on petroleum products, while accelerating the adoption of plugin vehicles (10). The problem was formulated with two incentives over an analysis
period, purchased rebates and publicly funded charging stations with the goal of
promoting plug-in electric vehicles. Due to the highly non-linear, non-convex
attribute of the problem, a non-linear optimization model was used to allocate
resources to each of the incentives over the analysis period. Consumer choices were
modeled using a simple logit-based vehicle choice model. To support policy making,
a satisfactory improvement over existing decision was deemed a sufficient solution,
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hence the use of the steepest descent direction algorithm was proposed for finding a
local optimum while proving that the KKT conditions are necessary for a local
optimum solution. Alternative polices were subsequently modeled against an
optimal policy to conduct a sensitivity analysis on the effect of each proposed
policies to the base case scenario. While the algorithm used in this study provided a
satisfactory convergence and was reasonably efficient, in theory, a local optimum
does not necessarily yield the best solution to the true solution.
A study by Wilfredo F. Yushimito et al. 2013 proposed a two-staged
optimization model for staggered work hours of a firm with an aim to flatten peak
hours of workers by assigning them to shoulders of peak hours under incentive
policies, consequentially lowering peak trip demands. A quadratic objective function
formulated as a nonlinear mathematical model as established by Ban et al. 2008 is
used to solver the network optimization, constrained by arrival and departure times
and benefits from government incentives. Hence, the first stage on the firm’s
workers assignment decision and second stage with workers decisions on arrival
and departure times. The underlying model quantifies the effects of the firm’s
workers response to external incentives and evaluates departure schedules
required to achieve a social optimum. The algorithm utilized in this study was
heuristic and at best able to find a feasible local solution that achieved a social
optimum in the system. The principle behind achieving a social optimum was to
bound the government incentive budget by congestion savings so that the society
will be better off. This guarantees that no extra fund will be required so as to ensure
the amount of incentive will not offset the savings in travel time. The social objective
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was ensured in the algorithms iterative process by setting the difference between
the savings in the total systems travel time and budget to be greater than 0 (11).
Bie Jing et al. 2009 conducted a similar study using economic incentives to
influence drivers’ route choice for safety enhancement. The modeling framework
was based of a route-based incentive structure introduced by a logistic company in
co-operation with an insurance company where drivers get rewarded for taking the
safest routes (12). In theory of this study, the incentive program adopts a win-win
situation that bring benefits to all stakeholders, leading the formulation of a bi-level
optimization designed to minimize/maximize cost and benefits whereby drivers
choose a safer route and the logistics and insurance company are never at a loss.
Hence safety in terms of equity on the incentive program is certainly guaranteed.
The efficiency of the solution algorithms on the aforementioned study was exclusive.
All theses studies are fundamental to understanding various incentive-based
optimization models but are limited in efficiency and equity of their solutions. This
paper will be predominantly focused on the use of a global algorithm solution and
its solution effect on a local algorithm solution along side an array of mathematical
problem formulations.
In furtherance, we simplify our model assumptions using a multinomial
discrete choice model with aggregated coefficients in predicting consumer’s choice
on the menu of mode choices provided. We take into account the baseline standard
variables relevant to decision mode choice in to this case study; in vehicle travel
time, out of vehicle travel time and cost in form of a token incentive parameter
specific to this case study.

8

1.3 Statement of Contribution
In the studies discussed above, little attention has been given to near global
and efficient solutions in terms of equity on incentive- based optimization, which is
a reasonable objective. Contribution belongs to a limited body of literature on
dealing with non-linear, non-convex incentive optimization problems on
transportation systems, which is considered a dynamic and evolving field of
investigation in transportation demand modeling.
We have a non-convex non -linear problem, which guarantees there could be
multiple local minima (maxima) solutions to the problem with high computational
time of obtaining a solution. Generally, finding a global optima solution is difficult
and really only practical for relatively small problems. Hence, we explore both
global and local solvers with a solution algorithm to obtain an optimal and feasible
solution and establish the quality/efficiency of both solutions on the problem.
In the first problem variant we consider an incentive optimization problem
that includes a lagrangian sub-problem where travelers are rewarded according to a
multinomial logit model constrained by a reward budget to induce energy savings.
For the first variant, we utilize a global and local solver algorithm to solve the nonlinear, non-convex problem to attain optimal and feasible solutions in terms of
energy savings. A unique feature of this paper is the second variant, which consists
of a series of parameterized formulations of the first problem, solved with a local
solver algorithm only. For this variant we establish a modeling framework and
numerical results that necessitates equity in incentive-based optimizations such
that the rewards assigned to travelers are proportional to energy savings while the
9

expected energy savings solution deviates from the optimal solutions of the original
problem. Theoretically, if the numbers of tokens (rewards) assigned are directly
proportional to the expected energy savings, the incentive policy is constrained to
be more equitable. We demonstrate that a high-quality solution can be obtained
quite fast with minor deviations on the solutions and a desired guarantee on the
performance of this modeling framework on problems of similar characteristics.

1.4 Research Objective
The objective of this study is to maximize energy savings by allocating
incentives to traveler’s to enable shifts to more energy-efficient modes.
Mathematical optimization conditions are formulated for the problem, first, a fullscale maximization problem followed by a series of parameterization formulations.
An optimization solution algorithm is proposed utilizing global and local solution
solvers to obtain optimal and feasible solutions. Transportation data is gathered for
the Town of Amherst, MA and used as a hypothetical case study. Results are
investigated through numerical tests, using sensitivity analyses to study the effects
of the incentive budget and coefficient of incentives on the optimal solutions across
the proposed problem formulations and solution algorithms. (Note: Incentive,
reward and token are used interchangeably through out this paper).
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY

2.1 Maximization Problem Formulation
In this section, the incentive policy design model is presented. The
formulation for this problem is based from an inference of the MNL model, where !
users exist in the transportation system, and each of them has a travel choice set of
!! . A multinomial logit-model is used to calculate !!" , the probability of user !
choosing alternative ! ∈ !! (Auto, Bus, and Bicycle) when making and OD trip j with
the equation,

!!" =

!"# (!!" )
!∈!! !"# (!!" )

,

(1)

Where !!" is the systematic utility for user ! and alternative !. A linear-inparameter specification is assumed for the systematic utility with two explanatory
variables for this study, travel time !!" (in-vehicle and out-vehicle travel of bus
included) and the number of tokens !!" , that is, !!" = !!!" + !!!" . The assumption of
two explanatory variables is not restrictive and can be relaxed easily to account for
more than two explanatory variables. Travel time !!" is a constant for any given user
and alternative across all origin-destination pair, and not a function of users’
choices, as no congestion effect is considered given the homogeneous user behavior
by an aggregate MNL model.
Let !!" be the energy saving of alternative ! for individual ! when compared
to a baseline energy consumption !, assumed a constant, i.e. not a function of users’
choices and no tokens awarded. E!" is the energy consumption attributed to
11

alternative ! for individual !. The baseline energy consumption E is calculated as
E!" × !!" of the auto alternative. Auto energy consumption E!" is calculated as the
amount in gallons it takes to traverse each OD pair in day,

!

!
!

!"#$ !"#$ !"#$#%& ( )

×

!".

!"#$%&'( !"#. Bus and bicycle energy consumption E!" are assumed to be 0
gallon/day based on a pre-assumption of a single occupancy auto vehicle. Hence, an
additional occupancy on a bus transit vehicle greater than one will result in no
additional energy consumption contribution to the system, therefore we can
attribute a null constant value to bus energy consumption.
The expected energy savings for the system, !(!), is distinguished by the
objective function, and calculated as,

Z(τ) =

!
!!!

!∈!! !!"

!"# (!!!" !!!!" )
!∈!! !"# (!"!" !!!!" )

,

(2)

≤ !.

(3)

Assumed a token budget of T, and the constraint is,

! τ =

!
!!!

!∈!! !!"

!"# !!!" !!!!"
!∈!! !"# !"!" !!!!"

The token allocation problem is then formulated as a constrained non-linear
optimization problem,

max! ! !
!. !. ! ! ≤ !
! ≥0

(4)

The first-order necessary condition of optimality is the KKT condition, that is,
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!!(!)
!!!"

=λ

!!(!)
!!!"

− µ!" , ∀! , ∀! ∈ !!

![! ! − !] = 0
!!! !!" = 0
! ≥0
!!" ≥ 0
! ! ≤!
! ≥0

,
, ∀! , ∀! ∈ !!
,
, ∀! , ∀! ∈ !!
,
,

(5)

!, can be interpreted as the shadow price of the budget constraint, that is, the
increase of the system-wide expected energy saving if one more token is available.
!!" is zero, if a positive number of tokens is assigned to alternative ! of person !.
The shadow price is zero, if the constraint is not binding, that is, there are
more than enough tokens. In this case, the stationary condition is that any
alternative of any user with a positive number of allocated tokens has zero marginal
energy saving per allocated token. The shadow price is positive when the budget
constraint is binding, that is, available tokens are used up. In this case, we have
!" (!)∕!!!"
!"(!)/!!!"

= λ, ∀! , ∀! ∈ !! !!" > 0.

(6)

The left-hand side of the equation can be interpreted as the marginal energy
saving per used token, and the stationary condition given limited token budget is
that any alternative of any user with a positive number of allocated tokens has the
same marginal energy saving per used token.

2.1.1 Solution Algorithm
Due to the nature of a choice probability function, any solution with the same
token differences across alternatives for a given person will give the same
probabilities and thus same expected energy savings. The expected token
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consumption is however different, and the constraint is less likely to be violated
with smaller number of tokens assigned. It is therefore advantageous to set
!!" = 0, where !!" = min !!" , ∀!.
!∈!!

The LHS of the constraint of the objective function is non-convex and thus the
feasible solution set is highly nonlinear but also very likely non-convex.
Consequently, it is difficult to establish the uniqueness of a global optimal solution
and a suitable algorithm is necessary to find a feasible and optimal solution.
Preliminary tests on small problem instances using Matlab’s optimization and global
optimization functions show that the constraint is almost always violated when it is
binding. It is therefore speculated that the constraint is “difficult” and a Lagrangian
relaxation algorithm is proposed. Note: The objective function is non-concave either.
The Lagrangian is

!(!) = max! ! ! − ! ! − ! , ∀! ≥ 0.

(7)

! ∗ is the optimal solution to the primal Problem (4). Due to weak duality,
! ≥ ! !∗ .
!(!) for any value of ! provides an upper bound for the optimal energy
saving and ! ∗ = min!!! !(!) is the tightest upper bound. Therefore, there exists a
duality gap as the objective function is non-concave, that is, ! ∗ > !(! ∗ ). It is still
valuable to solve min! !(!) as it measures the extent of the sub-optimality of any
solution to the original problem, along with a good lower bound/feasible solution.
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2.1.2 The sub-gradient algorithm
!(!) is convex but not smooth (with kinks) and thus not differentiable
everywhere. The sub-gradient algorithm is adopted to solve min!!! !(!).
At iteration k of the algorithm, two critical pieces of information is needed: the
sub-gradient ! ! and step size !! and a new trial value !!!! is calculated as in

!!!! = !! − !! ! ! .

(8)

A sub-gradient ! ! is ! − !(! ! ) where ! ! is the optimal solution to the relaxed
Problem (7) with ! = !! .
The Polyak step size can be used, that is,

!! =

!
! !! !!!"#$
!!!

(! ! )!

,

(9)

!
where !!"#$
− !! serves as an estimate of ! ∗ , and !! is in the scale of the

objective value with

!
!!! !!

= ∞,

!
!
!!! !!

< ∞. A practical choice for !! could be

!

! !!!, where ! is in the scale of the objective value and ! is a constant (usually 1, but
other values can be tried) (13).
To effectively optimize the Lagrangian problem, an alternative approach for
the step size is to used to calculate the step size when the polyak step sized failed to
yield optimum results in the trial phase of the analysis.

!! =

!! (! !! !! ∗ )
(! ! )!

,

(10)

where ! ∗ is the objective value of the best known feasible solution to the
original problem, and !! is a scalar chosen between 0 and 2. Frequently, the
sequence !! is determined by starting with !! = 2 and reducing !! by a factor of two
whenever ! (!! ) has failed to decrease in a specified number of iterations. !! was
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reduced by as factor of 2 after 10 consecutive iterations when !(!! ) failed to
decrease. The sub-gradient algorithm is implemented as follows:
STEP 1
% Set feasible solution to objective function ‘equation (4)’
Z(!*) lower bound/feasible solution
!* token original problem (4)
STEP 2
% Optimize Lagrangian function ‘maximize equation (7)’
( k) Upper bound
k
! optimal token lagrangian problem (7)
STEP 3 – preliminary checks
% Check initial gap
if ( k) > Z(!*)
else STEP 1
STEP 4
% Initial sub-gradient & step size estimate using at iteration k = 1
sk sub-gradient
!! = step size
STEP 5
% Obtain solution for k+1 iteration, Re-optimize Lagrangian function with new
dual variable.
While iter < MaxIter
= max[0, k – (ak * sk)];
%optimize lagrangian
( k+1) = max(Z(!k) + [ k+1 * (g(!k)-T]);
k+1

% update (sub gradient and step size)
if g(!k+1) <= T
%calculate
Z(!k+1)
sk+1 = T - g(!k+1);
ak = ck( ( k+1)- Z(!k+1))/(sk+1)2;
else

sk+1 = T - g(!k);
ak = ck( ( k+1)- Z(!k))/(sk+1)2;

end
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% update feasible solution
if Z(!k+1)> Z(!k)
Z(!k+1) =Z(!k+1)
else Z(!k+1) =Z(!k)
end
iter = iter +1; loop STEP 4 (recalculate step size & sub gradient)
end
End While
Final solution
optimal k+1
optimal !k+1
optimal

(

k+1)

STEP 6
%Perform checks
Upper bound should converge to lower bound (use upper bound
iteration convergence as checking criteria)
% Check dual gap
| ( k+1) - Z(!k+1)| < | ( k) - Z(!k)|
2.1.3 Feasible solution
Any feasible solution to Problem (4) serves as a lower bound to ! ∗ . A
reasonably good (at least better than assigning zero tokens) feasible solution is to
!

distribute ! tokens to each of the alternatives, and zero tokens to the least energyefficient alternative, of each person. This ensures that the token budget constraint is
satisfied (although not necessarily binding), as the expected token consumption is
!
!!!

!! !! !
!!! ! !!"

≤

!
!!!

!! !
!!! ! !!"

=

!
!
!!! !

!!
!!! !!"

=

!
!
!!! !

= !, assuming

without loss of generality that the least energy-efficient alternative is the last
alternative in the choice set for any given person !.
The optimal solution to the parameterized problem described in the section
below is a feasible solution to the original problem. At any iteration ! of the
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Lagrangian minimization problem, if ! ! ! ≤ !, ! ! ! is used as a new lower bound
if it improved the existing one.

2.2 Parameterized Token Allocation Strategies
Recent work has focused on optimizing incentives for end users but ignore
equity related to allocating incentive. Its important to note the difficulty in
determining an effective solution is due to the assumptions that the constraints are
allocated in divisible portions of a constrained budget and involves utility functions
that are complex mathematical forms involving probability measures.
Therefore, Instead of optimizing over the number of tokens for every user
and alternative, parameterization of the token allocation reduces the number of
decision variables and thus potentially reduces the computational time to obtain an
optimal solution in that the numbers of tokens assigned are directly proportional to
energy savings. This, however, comes with the price of solution sub-optimality.
In the simplest case, a single parameter, !, is defined as the token average
energy saving (TEE), and the number of tokens assigned to alternative ! of user ! is:

!!" = max

!!"
!

,0 .

(11)

Similar to the single parameterization strategy, a mode parameterization
strategy is formulated, whereby a duo of mode parameters (e-bus and e-bicycle) are
conceptualized as the TEE for bus and bicycle consecutively.

!!" = max

!!"
!!

,0 .

(12)

Furthermore, a more complex strategy is formulated for travel-time
parameters e, based on w categories of the average travel-time between bus and
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bicycle modes. The categories are broken down by a method of nearly equal
frequency distribution of trips in the order e-(7-22)minutes, e-(23-33)minutes and
e-(34-55)minutes.

!!" = max

!!"
!!"

, 0 . If

!!"
!!

is in the w-th bracket,

where w = average travel time category.
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CHAPTER IV
COMPUTATIONAL TEST DESIGN
We systematically investigate how the changes in token budgets and token
coefficients, i.e. token inflation rates, affect the system wide energy savings across
the original and parameterized problem formulations with a static optimization
model i.e. no congestion effects. Both the global and local ‘fmincon’ function in
MATLAB’s toolbox is used to solve the lagrangian function. (Figure 1) systematically
illustrates the distribution of the problem formulations and solution algorithms
evaluated. Duos of heuristic solution algorithms are further investigated to improve
the local solvers algorithm solutions, while token, mode and travel-time
parameterization strategies are investigated using the local solver solution
algorithm.
Heuristic 1 & 2-solution algorithm are cloned versions of the local solvers
solution algorithm. However, the iterative sub-gradient algorithm for Heuristic’s 1
algorithm is modified to scale up the assigned tokens of all users (OD pairs) when a
feasible solution is attained and the token constraint is not binding, while Heuristics
2 solution algorithm scales up when the token budget constraint is not binding and
down when the token budget constraint is violated.
Through the optimization computations, we measure the computational runtime of each solver and formulation. All computational experiments were carried
out on a PC running Windows with 8 GB memory and Core i7 3.4 GHz central
processing unit CPU.
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3.1 Token Budget/Coefficient
The token budget is designed based on an exogenous incentive budget
assignment with an initial value selected based on the assumption that the decision
maker’s choice is to realize a 10% reduction in the auto mode share. Through a
series of pretests, an assigned token budget of $5,000 was observed to have reduced
the choice probability of using auto mode by approximately 10% from the base case
scenario i.e. no token incentives. This token budget was subsequently used as a
starting point token budget. We further explore how changes in the token budget
affect the system’s energy savings by an increment of 10% corresponding to 10
different budgets.
Similarly, an initial is calculated using the logit model in parallel with the
choice probability of each alternative !! from the base case scenario with an
assumed average value of time of 20$/hr. The token coefficient is successively
increased by (50, 70,90,110,130 and 150)%.
Table 1: Solution Algorithms for the Full Problem and Parameterization
Strategy
Formulations
L.S
Global
Local

Full Problem
Lagrangian Heuristics
w/o
1
2
✔
✔

✕
✔

✕
✔

Parameterized
Lagrangian Solution
Single
Mode
✕
✔

✕
✔

TT
✕
✔

3.2 Input Data
Input data necessary for the analysis are obtained from the Pioneer Valley
Planning Commission (PVPC) for the Town of Amherst, MA (See Figure 2). They
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comprised a total of 21 traffic analysis zone’s (TAZ), each representing an origin and
destination, corresponding to 441 origin-destination pairs, of which encompassed a
24-Hr Origin Destination-demand matrix for each OD pair. The three modes of
transportation’s mode split; Auto 63.25 %, Bus 9.25 % and Bicycle 27.5 % are
observed from the PVPC database (14). and the token coefficients were adjusted to
match the observed mode split; Auto 62.48 %, Bus 9.78 % and Bicycle 27.73 %. A
total of 9404 trips were observed between all OD-pairs and it is assumed that the
demand through the analysis period is inelastic. Travel time !!" , in minutes for all
three modes of transportation are manually estimated using goggle maps for all ODpairs, while the distance between each OD pair is computed as: (average-speed *
Travel time !!" ). The networks computational average speed, auto fuel economy and
value of time of bus VOT, is assumed at values 35 mph, 23.4 mpg1 and 20 $/hr.
consecutively (15).
Using excel with previously obtained and assumed data, the travel time
coefficients are adjusted as follows: Auto -0.195/min, Bus in-vehicle -0.061/min,
Bus out-vehicle -0.122/min, Bicycle -0.15min, while the token coefficient of bus
0.183/$, which equals that of auto and bicycle for computations is calculated as: bus
in-vehicle travel time coefficient/ value of time of bus

!!"#$
!"#!"#

. This implies a

monetary value of a token to a dollar. The Alternative specific constant for auto was
interpolated to -0.05
Subsequently, the input data’s are processed for application to the problem
formulations as listed below:
1

MAPC Data Services, Massachusetts Vehicle Census: http://data.mapc.org/datasets
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Figure 1: Amherst Network
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
As described above, we conducted a series of analysis to study the
performance of various problems formulations and solution algorithms with
regards to the effects of token budgets and token coefficients on energy savings.
It is of importance to note that the scale of the optimality gaps in this analysis
can be misleading and not necessarily accurate, as these gaps represent the percent
difference between the solutions of lagrangian and objective function at a feasible
region. As observed from the solutions of the local solver algorithms in Table 1,
these values were lower than the results from the global solution algorithm, but
results from the local solvers algorithms converged at an optimality gap less than
1%. An explanation for this behavior is related to evidence that the lagrangian
function from the local solution algorithm might not be solved to a global optimum.
Theoretically, a true solution to the problem lies between the lagrangian and
objective function solutions. A non-global solution of the lagrangian will certainly
result in a lower lagrangian solution, but still above the true solution. Hence an
inaccurately underestimated optimality gap will be obtained at solutions that are
categorized by non-global lagrangian function solutions.
The results of this analysis are detailed in the sections below.
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4.1 Effectiveness and Efficiency of Solution Algorithms
4.1.1 Local vs. Global Solver for Lagrangian Solutions
When we consider the effectiveness of the global solver solution algorithm,
the results show a significant reduction in the system wide energy savings from the
base case scenario i.e. no token rewards in the system. The systems energy savings
was observed to have initially increased rapidly with subsequent incremental
increases as the token budget increased with a mildly non-linear relationship and
positive correlation of +0.9753. The average energy consumption reduced by
12.79% – 21.09% for a token budget range of $5,000-$10, 000. This corresponds to
a percent increase of the bus and bicycle mode share by 16.70% - 30.46% and
17.56% - 30.67% consecutively (See Table 1). The solutions average computational
run-time for this algorithm is 43hrs. The local solvers solution algorithm reduced
the average energy consumption by 11.48% - 19.91% for a token budget range of
$5,000-$10,000. This corresponds to a percent increase of the bus and bicycle mode
share by 11.94% - 16.60% and 19.33% - 26.15% consecutively (see Table 1). The
average computational run-time for this algorithm is 24 minutes. From these results
above, it is evident that the global solution algorithm performs better than the local
solution algorithm. For a range of $5,000-$10,000, the global solution algorithm
improved by 10.22% – 5.58% from the local solution algorithm (see Table 1).

25

Table 2: Results from Global vs. Local Solver Solution Algorithm

Token
Budget
($)

Global.S
Energy
Savings
(gal./day)

Local.S
Energy
Savings
(gal./day)

Global.S
Bus
Mode
Share
(%)

Global.S
Bicycle
Mode
Share
(%)

Local.S
Bus
Mode
Share
(%)

Local.S
Bicycle
Mode
Share
(%)

Global.S
vs.
Local
(% Diff)

5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
7500
8000
8500
9000
9500
10000

148.1
157.9
168.5
179.9
189.9
199.5
208.8
218.0
227.0
235.4
244.2

133.0
132.9
132.8
167.2
177.9
187.0
196.3
204.7
213.8
222.2
230.6

11.79
11.96
12.03
12.25
12.38
12.49
12.65
12.81
13.02
13.08
13.18

32.57
32.95
33.32
33.73
34.10
34.47
34.85
35.24
35.65
35.93
36.20

11.31
11.31
11.30
11.57
11.61
11.64
11.68
11.70
11.73
11.75
11.78

33.06
33.06
33.05
33.87
34.07
34.23
34.39
34.53
34.68
34.81
34.94

-10.22
-15.81
-21.20
-7.04
-6.33
-6.26
-5.98
-6.10
-5.81
-5.63
-5.58

4.1.2 Optimality Convergence of Global Solver Solution Algorithm
Observations indicates that all solution from the global solvers solution
algorithm converges with an optimality gap less than 1%, which suggests the
solutions have less than a 1% error margin to the true solution. (Figure 2) shows the
convergence chart for the lagrangian function solution (upper bound) and the
energy savings objective function (lower bound) for a token budget of $5000. The
convergence is verified through an iterative method using the sub-gradient
algorithm. The 4 noticeable groups of oscillation on the chart are as a result of the
changes in scale of the step size of the sub-gradient algorithm. During the course of
the iterative process, as the lagrangian function fails to reduce after an initial preset
iteration count 20, then subsequently 10, the step size scale is reduced by a factor of
2 until a lower lagrangian solution is obtained concurrently with a better (higher)
26

feasible solution of objective function. This sequence is repeated until both
functions converge at an optimality gap less than 1%.
Figure 2: Optimality Gap Convergence Chart of Energy Savings
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4.1.3 Lagrangian Heuristics
Observations from the local solvers solution sets indicate that the token
budgets $5500 and $6000 had optimal gaps of 8.66% and 15.02% consecutively,
significantly higher than an acceptable threshold of 1%. A duo of lagrangian
heuristic solution algorithms are proposed to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of the local solver’s solution algorithm for token budgets were by the
lagrangian and objective function failed to converge at an acceptable optimal gap, as
described in the chapter above. This failure is attributed to the oscillation of the
lagrangian function solutions at a local optimum.
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For token budgets $5500 and $6000, the first heuristic solution algorithm
(heuristic 1) is observed to improve the performance of the local solvers algorithm.
Although still worse off than the global solution algorithms, the realized energy
savings was 9.90% and 8.69% consecutively lower than the global solution
algorithms, when compared to 15.81% and 21.20% from the local solution
algorithm, while the computational run time was reduced by (25mins) a 99.03%
change from the global solutions run time (43 hrs.). The Latter (Heuristic 2) results
to a 9.22% and 6.64% reduction consecutively from the global solution algorithm,
while the computational run time was reduced by 99.49% (13mins) from the global
solution algorithm. Nevertheless, both heuristic solutions are noted to be worse off
than the local solvers solutions for token budget solutions that already had a
significantly low optimal gap (less than 1%), as observed for the solutions of all
token budgets except 5500 and 6000. This failure in improvement is attributed to
distortions in the iterative process as the objective functions are heuristically scaled.
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Table 3: Effects of Global Solver Algorithm vs. Local Optimization Solver
Heuristic Solutions

Token
Budget
($)
5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
7500
8000
8500
9000
9500
10000

Global.S
Energy
Savings
(gal. /day)
148.1
157.9
168.5
179.9
189.9
199.5
208.8
218.0
227.0
235.4
244.2

Local.S
Optm.
[NoHeuristic]
(gal. /day)
133.0
132.9
132.8
167.2
177.9
187.0
196.3
204.7
213.8
222.2
230.6

Heuristic- Heuristic1
2
(gal. /day) (gal. /day)
130.2
142.3
153.9
166.6
176.4
178.5
191.1
203.5
212.4
222.7
221.8

130.2
143.4
157.3
166.8
168.1
187.3
196.4
204.6
213.8
221.5
229.5

Global.S
vs.
Heuristic1 (% diff)
-12.09
-9.90
-8.69
-7.38
-7.09
-10.54
-8.47
-6.63
-6.44
-5.41
-9.17

Global.S
vs.
Heuristic2 (% diff)
-12.08
-9.22
-6.64
-7.29
-11.48
-6.14
-5.93
-6.13
-5.82
-5.90
-6.00

4.2 Effectiveness and Efficiency of Parameterization Strategies
Results from the parameterized formulations were observed to have resulted
in lower energy savings when compared to the original problem formulation with a
global solver solution algorithm. The parameterization strategy analyses were
conducted using a local solver algorithm for the lagrangian solutions. Although, from
observation of the local vs. global solution algorithm above, it is evident that the
local solvers solution algorithm did not solve the lagrangian functions to optimum
solutions, which resulted in lower energy savings when compared to the global
solvers solution algorithm. An exhaustive search method is used to validate the
solutions of the token parameterization solutions of the lagrangian are solved to the
optimal solution with the correct optimality gap to the objective function. This
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selection was based on the analogy and can be theoretically proven that the
solutions of the token parameterized formulations are convex at optimum.
Observations from this analysis showed a generic improvement in the energy
savings across all three-parameterization strategies as token budget is increased.
Overall, across all token budget scenarios, travel-time, mode and token
parameterization solutions, were observed to be 3.2%, 13.4% and 13.7%
consecutively less than the solutions obtained from the original formulation with a
global solver. These results indicate road users are more sensitive to average traveltime over mode choice and token consumption. Hence, the travel time
parameterization strategy can be considered as more efficient token allocation
strategy from the menu of strategies observed.
Mode/token parameterization and travel time and strategies improved the
problems computational efficiency by 99.81% (5mins) and 99.73% (7mins)
consecutively. To save computational time, it is observed that the parameterized
allocation strategy could be used in place of the original problem with a global
solver, but not without an optimality penalty i.e. ranging between 4.5-18.3% for a
token budget of 5000. (See Table 3).
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Table 4: Global Solver Algorithm vs. Parameterization Strategies Effect of
Original Formulation
Token
Budget
($)

Single
P.Strategy
(gal.
/day)

Mode
P.Strategy
(gal. /day)

TravelTime
P.Strategy
(gal. /day)

Global vs.
Single
P.Strategy
(% Diff.)

Global vs.
Mode
P.Strategy
(% Diff.)

5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
7500
8000
8500
9000
9500
10000

121.0
131.7
142.2
152.5
162.5
172.5
182.3
191.6
200.8
210.5
219.3

121.0
131.7
143.3
153.5
163.6
173.0
183.1
191.8
202.0
211.3
220.3

141.5
152.3
162.6
171.4
183.2
193.4
203.0
212.4
221.2
230.6
239.1

-18.27
-16.58
-15.62
-15.25
-14.42
-13.52
-12.68
-12.11
-11.54
-10.58
-10.18

-18.27
-16.58
-14.98
-14.67
-13.86
-13.30
-12.29
-12.00
-11.04
-10.27
-9.78

Global vs.
TravelTime
P.Strategy
(% Diff.)
-4.474
-3.551
-3.498
-4.723
-3.527
-3.070
-2.752
-2.564
-2.561
-2.044
-2.076

4.2.1 Token Efficiency in Various Parameterization Strategies
As expected, the token energy efficiency parameter decreased as the token
budget increased. This observation indicates that as more tokens are introduced
into the system, the energy savings in the system increases while road users
consume more tokens. It is of importance to note the inversely non-linear
relationship between the token budgets and energy savings per token !. As the
token budget increased, the average energy savings per token reduced. An
explanation for this observation is in accordance with the allocation of more tokens
to the same level of energy savings as the token budget increased, hence a smaller
energy savings per token will be realized. (See Appendix A)
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4.3 Sensitivity Analysis w.r.t Token Coefficient
Similarly, for a token budget of 5000, a 50-150% increase of the token
coefficient resulted in a reduction ranging between 17.4% – 25.84% in energy
savings (see Table 5). Changes in the token coefficient appear to be sensitive to the
systems energy savings. Energy savings was observed to increase as token
coefficient increased. The two variables are correlated by an index of +0.997, which
suggest a strong correlation. The optimality gaps for all solution were less than 2%.
The solution obtained when the coefficient of token are varied with a fixed base
budget show that energy savings increases as the coefficient of tokens are increased.
The energy savings per token increases as the coefficient of token increase with a
non-linear relationship. The token coefficient has a proportional relationship with
the value of time. Therefore, as the VOT is increased, the results indicate an increase
in energy savings. This essentially means the model is somewhat sensitive to road
users VOT.
Table 5: Effect of Token Coefficient
Token Budget
($)

Token coefficient
(% Incr.)

Energy Savings
(gal./day)

Energy Savings
(% Change)

5000
5000
5000
5000
5000
5000

50
70
90
110
130
150

202
227
245
267
283
299

17.47
19.58
21.18
23.01
24.46
25.84
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of Findings
An incentive optimization method with global and local solvers is presented
that maximizes logit model based formulations to attain optimal and feasible
solutions w.r.t energy savings while satisfying budget constraints. Important
parameters that affect energy saving’s in a road transportation system have been
studied, both the token budget and coefficients of token. We also present a
parameterized formulation that necessitates equity in the allocation of a
constrained budget and highlight the efficiency of this approach through numerical
results. This formulation ensures that each unit of reward is equitable to a single
unit of energy savings and provides alternative policy options to decision makers.
Strong evidence exists to conclude that there is a positive correlation between the
system’s energy savings and the aforementioned parameters. An increase in the
token budget resulted to an increase in expected energy savings as expected, while
the travel-time parameterization provided a more cost effective computation as a
substitute to the original problem formulation, saving significant computational
time. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrated that a global solver algorithm is
necessary to obtain a best attainable optimal solution when designing an incentive
optimization problem. These observations substantiate the concept that incentives
allocation in a transportation system is an alternative strategy to congestion pricing
in reducing fuel consumption and ultimately increasing energy savings with less
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resources expended while eliminating the often referenced social equity amongst
road users.
While this research has been able to successfully demonstrate that assigning
rewards to a transportation network can effectively result to the reduction of
fuel/energy consumption, it is important to note that the same outcomes or
attributes might not necessarily apply when formulated for a different city, as mode
splits and travel time indexes will vary across different cities.

5.2 Limitations
With these potential modeling framework contributions in mind, it is
essential to recognize its associated limitation. The Town of Amherst is
geographically constrained by a sprawled network with a moderate public transit
service relative to its size. When considering transit options, on average the distance
and travel time between a majority of the OD pairs is relatively large, which signals
a higher likelihood of road users using auto mode to avoid high door to door
walking distance. Similarly, bikers would be less willing to bike long distance in
other to save travel time. Taking into consideration weather effects, road users will
be less willing to use mass transit during inclement weather conditions. Another key
limitation of this study is the omission of road users household and socioeconomic
variables. The absence of these characteristic variables could potential increase the
likelihood of model bias upwards on the solutions.
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5.3 Future Work
Due to the complexity and non-linear characteristic of the problem studied.
The model was simplified by using a naive and simplistic utility function to ensure
proper understanding of the characteristics of the decision variables involved.
Future studies on this research can be improved by expanding the vehicles classes
(truck/cars etc.) used in the model to further reflect a more realistic representation
and variability of energy consumptions by road users. The model can subsequently
be expanded by increasing the number of decision variables that affect individual
choice of modes of road transportation to improve the predictability and reduce
bias of the choice models/probability in the utility function. The traffic conditions
for the analysis are considered the best-case scenario based on the assumption of
free flow travel speed, which accounts for a constant travel time. A dynamic
optimization approach can be used to model the problem rather than a static
optimization to reflect realistic congestion effects, which include dynamically
varying rewards based on the current and predicted state of the system. Similarly,
future research in this area of study will comprise of a bi-level optimization problem
formulation where a high level optimization aims at maximizing system-wide
energy savings, while a low-level consumer surplus maximization problem is solved
for each system user.
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APPENDIX
TABLE RESULTS OF TOKEN EFFICIENCY FOR PARAMETERIZED STRATEGIES

Parameterization -

Token
Budget
($)

e

Single

Mode

Energy
Savings
(gal./day)

Global
vs.
Single
P. (%
Diff.)

e-bus

ebike

Average Travel-Time

Energy
Savings
(gal./day)

Global
vs.
Mode
P. (%
Diff.)

e-[(7-22)min.]

5000

0.095

121.0

-18.27

0.065

0.117

121.0

-18.27

*

0.257

0.054

141.5

Global
vs.
Travel
Time P.
(%
Diff.)
-4.47

5500

0.087

131.7

-16.58

0.063

0.109

131.7

-16.58

*

0.196

0.052

152.3

-3.55

6000

0.081

142.2

-15.62

0.059

0.095

143.3

-14.98

*

0.160

0.050

162.6

-3.50

6500

0.076

152.5

-15.25

0.056

0.088

153.5

-14.67

*

0.138

0.048

171.4

-4.72

7000

0.072

162.5

-14.42

0.054

0.082

163.6

-13.86

*

0.117

0.046

183.2

-3.53

7500

0.068

172.5

-13.52

0.052

0.077

173.0

-13.30

*

0.103

0.044

193.4

-3.07

8000

0.064

182.3

-12.68

0.051

0.072

183.1

-12.29

*

0.093

0.043

203.0

-2.75

8500

0.062

191.6

-12.11

0.049

0.069

191.8

-12.00

*

0.084

0.041

212.4

-2.56

9000

0.059

200.8

-11.54

0.047

0.064

202.0

-11.04

*

0.078

0.040

221.2

-2.56

9500

0.056

210.5

-10.58

0.046

0.061

211.3

-10.27

*

0.072

0.039

230.6

-2.04

10000

0.054

219.3

-10.18

0.045

0.059

220.3

-9.777

*

0.067

0.038

239.1

-2.08

Note: * indicates a very large number for e (no token assigned)

36

e-[(23-33)min.]

e-[(34-55)min.]

Energy
Savings
(gal./day)
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